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Thi s pap e r st ud ie s a princ ip a l -ag en tr e lationshi p wi th mor al hazard i n whi c h the
pri nci pal or the sup ervisor can m oni to r the ag en t ’s hid den action b y usi ng i den ti cal
monitorin g tec hn o l ogies. The p a p er sho ws t ha t de legation of moni t orin g t o the
sup ervisor is pro￿ta b le b ecause of t w o e￿ects. With del egat i on the prin ci pal can
b e t ter regul at et h e i ncen tiv es ( i ncen ti v e e￿ect) a nd c a n co mmi t to w a ge structures
tow hi c h she coul d not c o mmi t w i thout del egat i on (comm i tmen te ￿ e ct) . As a
l o gi cal step coll usi on is i n t ro du ced and i t i s sho wn that ev e n with the p ossi bi li t y
of coll usi o n del egat i o ni sa n opt i mal s trat eg y .
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1 In tro duc ti on
Stan dard ag e ncy the o ry tel ls us that op ti m al ince n tiv es c hem es m ak e use of all a v ail ab l e
inform ati o n related to the a gen t’ s p erform ance. H a rt an d Holm st r ￿ o m (19 87 ) see in this
su￿ci en t sta ti stic result \the m ai n predi cti v e con te n t of the b asic ag e ncy m o del ". T he y
concl ud e t h at \ agency re lations hi ps cre a te a dem and fo r m onitori n g". Pri ncipals are
in tereste di nm on i to ri ng , sinc ei t cre at e s inform ation ab out the a gen t’s b eha vi o r. Tirol e
(19 86 ) ,h o w e v e r, notes that i fm on i to ri ng is p erform e db y a third pa rt y (the sup e rvisor)
then new pro bl em s can a ri se. The s up erv iso r has hi so wn in terests a nd these m a yb e i n
c o n ￿ i c tw i th t h e princi pa l ’s. Tirole in tro du c es the p ossibil it yo fc ol lusion b e t w ee n the
sup e rvisor and the agen t a nd sho ws that it li m i ts the scop e of i m ple m en ta bl ec on tra c ts .
Rec en tm od e ls l ik e La￿ on t and Tirole (19 91) and Kofm an n a nd L a w arr ￿ ee (1 993 ) dev elop
the ide a of c ol lusion in a pri nc ipal-sup erv isor- agen t hie ra rc h y further .
None of these pap ers, ho w e v e r, ex pl ains w h y the princ ipal nee ds a third pl a y er as
m onitor. Im pl ici tly they as sum e tha t the s up ervi so r i sm or ee ￿ cie n ti nm on i to ri ng , or
that the pri nc ipal do e sn o th a v e the tim e. The ex plana ti on i s therefore s i m i lar to w h y
the princ ipal needs an ag e n t in the ￿rst p l ace. The questi on , h o w ev er, i si m por t an t,
since the threat o f coll us i on seem st oi ndicate tha t the princ ipa l is b ette ro ￿p e rform ing
m onitoring hersel f. Tirole (1 99 2) ev en cl ai m s that \ [ s]tanda rd su￿ci en t sta ti stic s princ i-
ple s for re w ard i ng ag e n ts do not ho l di n the presenc e o f coll us i o n". Thi s p ape r e x pl ic itl y
add re ss e s the que st i o n of eng aging an indep enden t sup e rvisor.
Th e proble mi s ana l yze di nas i m ple ag e ncy s e tting wi th hi dd e n acti on ( m ora l haz-
ard). M on i to ri ng of the agen t’ s acti o n is p oss i ble and c an be p e r fo rm ed b ye i ther the
princ ipal o r a n inde p ende n t sup ervi s or. The pa p er sho w s tha t dele g ati on of m onitoring
is preferre db y the princi pa l ,e v e n when th e re exi s t p o ssibil iti es of collusi o n. There are
t w oe x plana ti o ns for the result. Fi rs t ,t h e m od e l as sum es tha t the de cisi o n to m onitor
and the c ho i ce of the a gen t’ s acti o n are ta k en sim ultaneous l y .W et a k e thi s as the m ost
reali stic s e tting. T he princi pa l then has to use c on tracts to cre at e t w ot y pe so f i ncen-
tiv es. On the one ha nd, she has to induce the agen tt ot a k ea h i g h e￿ort lev el . On the3
other ha nd, she m us t set i ncen tiv es in order for m on i toring t o tak ep l ace, sinc e the ag e n t
wil l not c ho ose a high e ￿ ort l ev el w he nm onitoring do e s no t o ccur. When the princi pa l
do es no t dele g ate m onitoring she ha s only one c on tra c t throug h w hi c hs h ec a n regu l ate
b ot h i ncen tiv es. I f the princ ipal de legates m onitoring, then she h as also the con tra c to f
t h e s u p e r v i so r b y whi c h she can cre a te ince n tiv es. The i dea tha t i n a pri ncipal-ag e n t
rel at i on shi p with m on i toring the princi pa l has to cre at e t w ot yp es o f ince n tiv es is not
new. Khal il (19 91) studies a m o del i n whic h the princi pa l c a n a udit the agen t’ s action
ex p o st.
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The pap e r sho ws tha t if the pri ncipal can not c om m i tt oa u d i ting e xa n te,
then the princi pa l ha s to desi gn c on tracts i n suc haw a y th at she wi ll ha v e ince n tiv es to
aud i te x - p o st. Khali lc l aim s that the m o del is equi v al en t to a "three-p erso n sce na ri o"
w i th three ph ysicall y disti nct pla y ers: a pl a y e r who d e sign s the c on tract, a n a gen tw h o
c ho o se s an acti on an d a t h i rd pla y er who dec ides w he ther to au di t th e agen t’ s acti on . I n
our c on t ext this cl ai m is no t correc t.
Second, it i s a ssum ed that inform ation wh i c hr e su l ts fro m the m onitoring pro ce dure
is pri v a te . This im plie s tha t the m onitor ha s to deci de whethe rt o m ak e the inform ation
publi c or to wi th hold i t. W he n th e princi pa l del ega tes m on i to ri ng , she c a nnot com m i t
to rev eali ng i nf or m at i o n whic h wil lh urt h e r. S he can therefore not use a carro t and
stic k appro ac h, b ec a use she wil l not rev eal i nfo rm at i o n whic h forces her to ha nd out the
carrots . I f the p r inci pa l del eg ates m on i to ri ng com m i tm en t to a carro t a nd stic k a pproa c h
is p oss i ble and , as w e sho w , op ti m al. D e le g ation has there fo re also a c om m itm en t e￿ect.
W e sho w that with del ega ti o n the princi pa l i s able to appro xi m ate th e ￿rst b e s t solution
b y setti ng w ag e di ￿e rence s whic h tend to in￿nit y . It is then a r g ued that thi si m pli es
that there a re l a rge b ene ￿ts fro m side-c on tracti ng (coll us i o n) a nd that i ti su n r e al isti c
to ass um e tha t under these extre m ec i rcum stances coll us i o n wil l no t tak ep l ac e .A sa
l ogical ste pw e , the refore, i n t r odu c e the p o ssibi lit yo fc o s t l y coll us i o n, whic he na bl es us to
1
Note that w ea s sum e that the agen t’s ac ti on and the m onito ri ng de cision are c hose n s i m ul tane o us l y
rathe r than s eque n ti al ly . In thi s r es pec t i ti s i ll um i nating to str es s the di￿ere nce b e t w een a ud i ting,
whic ht ypi ca ll y o cc urs after an a c tio n has b e en tak en, and m o nitoring whic h o cc urs whil e an actio ni s
tak en or a t a sk i s bei ng p e rfo rm ed .4
para m eteri ze t h e degree o f co m m i tm en t. It i s shown that ev en wi tho ut the com m i tm e n t
e￿ec td e legation i s stil l pro￿ta bl ed u et o the inc en ti v ee ￿e c tm en tioned ab o v e .
Th e re s t of the pa p er is o rgan i ze d as follo ws. The n e xt s e cti on i n t r odu c es the m o del.
Sec tion 3 ana l yze s the gam e when the pri ncipal acts a s m o nit or . Se cti o n 4 s tudi es the
ga m e when the pri ncipal dele g ates m on i to r ing to the s up ervi so r. Sec tion 5 and 6 study
di￿ere n t a sp ects o f col lusion. Se ction 7 concl ud e s.
2 The M o del
The gam ei s p l a y e db y three risk neutral pl a y e rs: a pri nc ipal, a s up erv iso r a nd a n a gen t.
Al lp l a y e rs ha v e the ob jec tiv et om ax i m i ze th e ir e xp ecte dp a y o￿ . Outs i de options o f the
sup e rvisor a nd ag e n t are norm ali zed to ze ro . B o th pla y ers are also pro te cted b yl i m i ted
li ab i li t y . They c a nnot b e forced to m ak e p o siti v e tra nsfers to the pri ncipal.
Th e ag e n ti se m pl o y e db y the princi pa l ’s ￿rm .H e ha s the c ho i ce b et w ee nw orking at
a hi g h e￿o rt le v e l a
H
and w orki ng at a lo we ￿ ort lev el a
L
. The para m eter a
i
(i = H ; L)
repre s e n ts the di s uti li t yo f e ￿ ort i nm on e ta ry te rm s. I ti s ass um ed tha t the a gen t disl ik es




> 0. The e￿o r t of the a gen ti s not o bserv able.
As the o wner of the ￿rm the pri ncipal rec eiv es the outp ut resulti ng fro m the a gen t’s
e￿o r t. A hi g h ou tput y
H
re su l ts when the a gen t’s e￿o rt is a
H
. The princ ipal rece iv es
al o w output y
L
when the a gen t’s a c tion i s a
L





oc curs a f ter the a gen th a s e xerte d his e￿o r t. W e as sum e tha t the pri ncipal c a pture s the
outp ut di rectl ya n dc a nnot p ro duce hard e vide nce on th e to tal output rece iv ed. Output
is there fo re also n ot o bserv able .
W e ass um e that a costly m on i toring tec hno l og y i sa v ai lable . The te c hnolog y is c on -
troll ed b yt he m onitor, who c an e ither b e t h e princi pa l or the sup e rvisor. If th e m onitor
dec ides to m on i to r, he ￿rst has to pa yac os t c> 0. A fter pa y ing the c o st the action of
the a gen ti s rev eale d with a proba bi lit y ￿ . Note th at the m on i to r ing pro c edure is i m p er-
fec ti n the sense tha t no t a l w a ys a result is o btained. I f, ho w e v e r ,ar e su l ti s obta i ned
then the m on i to r has ha rd ev idenc e a b out th e a gen t’s a c tion. The ev idence is priv ate to5
the m onitor, but wh e ni ti sr e v ea l ed, i ti sv er i￿a bl eb yat h i rd p art y .
Th e m on i to ri ng pro ce dure itsel fi s not v eri ￿a bl e. It cannot b e c he c k ed b y the pla y ers
whether the m onitor actuall yp a i d the cost c an d m onitored. T he refore, if the m onitor
cl ai m st h a tn o t h i ng w a s o bserv ed from the m on i to ri ng pro ce s s, then this c an h a v e thre e
causes. It m igh t b e tha t the m on i to r di d n ot m onitor at a l l. I tm a yh a v e ha pp ened that
the m on i to r di dm on i to r, but did no t get a result. Or, it m igh t b e tha t the m on i tor did
m onitor and go t a re su l t, but di d no t rev eal i t. The only v eri￿able sta te s o f the w orld in
the m o del are there fo re the foll o wing. Sta te H: It is rev eale d tha t the ag e n t’s acti on w as
a
H
. State L : I t is rev ea l ed th at t h e ag e n t’s a ct ion w as a
L
. Stat e N :N o thi ng is re v e al ed
ab out the acti o n of the a gen t.
Th e pri nci pa l o ￿e rs a con tract w to the a gen t and a con tract t to the sup ervi s or, w he re
a con tract is a set o f con ti ng en t transfers from the pri ncipal to a cer ta i n pla y er co v ering
all v eri￿able states of the w orld. T ogether w i th the as sum pt i on of l im i ted li ab i lit y the
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B e f o re prese n ting th e ti m i ng of the ga m ew e rec ap i tu l ate th e m ai n assu m ptions of
our pri nc ipal-ag e n tm o del . The a gen t’ s acti o n a nd the resulti ng ou t p ut are un v e ri￿able.
Co stl ym onitoring ca n b e p e rform ed b ye ither the pri ncipal or the sup erv isor and is
also un v eri ￿a bl e. Onl y the result of m on i toring i sv eri ￿a bl e, but in ￿rst i nsta nce p ri v ate
inform ati o n to the p erso n who m onitored.
Th e t im i ng of t h e gam ei s as foll o ws :
t=0 : Thep r inci pa l a ssigns the m on i to ri ng tec hno l og y t o h e rs e lf or to the su p erv iso r .
t=1 : The princ ipal o ￿ers a c on tra c t w to t he ag e n t and a con tract t to the s up erv iso r.
t=2 : The su p erv iso r and agen t dec ide whether to acc ept the con tract.
t=3 : The ag e n t a nd the m onitor pla y a sim ultaneou s m o v eg a m e. The ag en tc ho oses




). The m onitor deci des whethe rt o m on i tor or
not (M or N ).6
t=4 : In the case of m onitoring, na ture re v e al s th e true action to th e m onitor w i th
proba bil it y ￿ .
t=5 : I f nature rev eale d the a gen t’ s acti o n-dec ision, th e m on i tor de cide s whether to
m ak e the o btaine di nfo rm at i o n publi co rt o w i thh ol di t.
t=6 : P a y o ￿s a re re al ize d.
Th e inform ational structure is suc h that ex cept for the m onitor’s an d th e ag en t’s dec i-
sion a nd the fact whethe r na ture re v e al ed an ything in step 4 all v ariable s and pa ram e ters
are com m on kno wledge b e t w e en th e p l a y e rs.
W e lo ok fo r subg am e p erfec te quil ibria o f the g am eb y taki n g the f ol lo wing pro c e-
dure. Fi rs t, w e consider the c as e i n whic h the princ ipa l ha s con trol o v er the m onitoring
tec hno l og y .W ec al l this \ the gam e without de legation" . W ec ha racte rize the optim al
con tract a nd c om pute the m axi m um pa y o￿ to the princi pa l .S e con d, w e study the case
in whic ht h e pri ncipal del ega te sm on i to ri ng to the sup e rvisor a nd refer to th i s subga m e
as \ the g am e wi th del ega ti o n". W et h e n com pare and in v esti g ate whet he rb y dele g ation
the princ ipal can ac hiev ea h i gh e rp a y o￿ .
W e are i n tere st e di n com paring the c o sts of im pl em e n ting t h e acti on a
H
w h e n the
princ ipal a cts a s m on i tor and when the sup e rvisor c on trol s the m on i to r ing tec hno l og y .
Therefore w e a ssum e tha t para m eters are suc h that the pri ncipal pre fers to i m pl em e n t
the acti on a
H
wi th a t least so m e pos i tiv e proba bi lit y under b oth p oli ci es. T hi sw i ll b e
the case if the di￿ere nce ￿y i sl a rge enough .
As a b enc hm ark consider the c as e i nw h i c h the a gen t’ sa c t ion i s o bserv able and v e ri￿-
able. Iti so b vious that in this case th e princ ipal c a n a ppropriate the en tire s urpl us from
the action a
H
wit h out the us e o f the costly m on i to ri ng tec hno l og y .B y cond i tioning the







sim ilar result obta i ns when w e as sum e that o utput is v e ri￿able.
When e￿ ort and output a re not v e ri￿able the acti on a
H
can o nl yb ei nduced when
m onitoring tak e sp l ace. Without m onitoring the only sta te w hi c hc a n o ccur i s the state7




. Consequen tly ,
the princi pa l c a nnot i nduce the a gen t to tak et h e acti on a
H
a n d h er m axi m um pa y o￿ i n







3 The Gam e without D e legat i on
I n t h i s se c ti on w e a naly ze the g am ei n whi c h the princi pa l c on t ro l s the m onitoring
tec hno l og y .W e sho w that in thi s setti ng i t is optim al for the pri ncipal to induce the
ag e n tt o t a k e the hi g h action wi th proba bi lit y o ne. Wh e n the m onitoring t ec h nology
is ine ￿ci en t this requi res tha t the princi pa l has to m onitor wi th proba bi li t y on e and
that a ren ti sl eft to the agen t. When the m onitori n g tec hno l o g yi sr e l at i v ely e ￿ci en t,
it is p os si bl e fo r the pri ncipal to induce the hi gh ac tion without ful lm on i to ri ng . In the
optim um the a gen tr e cei v e sh i s rese rv at i on w ag e and m on i to r ing o ccurs w i th a pro babil it y
le ss than one.
If the pri nci p al do es no t dele g ate the m on i toring dec ision then the g am ei sp l a y ed
b y the princ ipal and the ag e n to n l y . The sup e rvisor pla y s no role a nd w e can s e t his
con tractt o t =( 0 ; 0 ; 0) . I n the re s t of t hi s sec tion th e s up ervi so r wil lb ed i srega rded.
Sup p os e that the pri ncipal deci des t om onitor and that m on i to ri ng is su c cessful.
This m eans tha t the princi pa l has the v eri￿able e videnc e th at the agen t’ s action w as a
i
( i = H; L ). In sta ge 5 of the g am e s he has to deci de whether to re v e a l th e evi dence. The
dec ision dire ctl ya ￿ e cts her p a y o￿ s. C onceal ing the e vide nc er e su l ts in a p a y m en to fw
N
,
whil e rev eali ng t h e inform ation resul ts i nap a ym en to f w
i
. T he princi pa l wil l there fore






This ob se rv at i on h as a n i m p o rtan ti m plic at i on .







.I n t h e exi sting princ ipa l -a gen tl i terature with m on i to ri ng , ho w ev er, i t
is often obta i ned tha t i n this setting it i s optim a l for th e princi pa l to use a carro t and
stic k a pproa c h (e.g. B o rde r and Sob e l (1 98 7), Mo ok erhjee and Png (19 89)). He re s uc h
2
W ithout loss o f gen erali t yw e ado pt the ti e -breaking rule that the p ri nc i pal re v ea l s her evidenc e
when s he is i nd i ￿e ren t.8
as c hem ei s not p oss i ble.









.T h i si m pl ies that in stag e 5 the pri nci pa l wi ll a l w a ys
rev eal her i nf or m at i on .
P r o p o s i t ion 1 Without loss of g ene r ality we may assume that the optimal c ont r act








an d in duc es ful l r ev elat i on of the
pr in cip a l ’s monit o ring e viden c e.









can also b e attained b y a con tract whic h do es satisfy the











. I f the pri nc ipal m onitors and o btains the result a
i
, she wil l deci de no t to
rev eal i t. I n ste a d of pa ying w
i
the princi pa l wil lp a y the l o w er w ag e w
N
. T he pa y o￿ s










g. N o te th at the c on tract w
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s tage 5 of
the ga m eb e com es redundan t. A n y resul t whi c h is obta i ned fro m the m onitoring pro cess
is auto m at i cally rev ea l ed. A s a cons e quence the s ubga m e a s of s tage 3 i sr e du c ed to a
sim ultaneous m o v eg a m ew i th t w o acti on s f o r eac h pla y er. Th e strategy s pace of the
princ ipal i s S
P







￿ 2 [0; 1 ] repre se n t the p r o babili t y tha t the princi pa l m onitors. Sim il ar l y ,l et ￿ 2 [0; 1]
d enote the proba bi li t y that the ag e n t tak e s the a c tion a
H
, then the pa y o ￿ functi o ns are
U
P
(w ; ￿; ￿ ) ￿ ￿y
H
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( w ; ￿; ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ w
H
+( 1 ￿￿ ) ￿￿ w
L




￿ (1 ￿ ￿)a
L
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Let N (w ) b e the set of N a sh equi libri a for a g i v e nw age con tra c t w . T he c om bination
(w ; ￿; ￿ ) i sf e as i bl ei fi t satis￿es the fo l lo wi n g cons tr ai n ts.
U
A
(w; ￿; ￿ ) ￿ 0














S i m il ar l y ,w es a y that the co n tra c t w i s feas i ble if there exi s ts a strategy pair ( ￿; ￿ ) 2
N ( w) suc h that the com bi na ti on ( w ; ￿; ￿ ) is feas i ble. A s ubga m ep e rfec te quil ibri um







) s u c h t h a t t h e r ed o e s not exi s t a feasible co n tra c t w
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) 2 N ( w
0






) t o t h e fol-
lo wi ng m ax im i zation prob l em is a subg am ep e rfect equil ibri um outcom eo f t h e ga m e
without de legation.




(w; ￿; ￿ )
s:t : (w ; ￿; ￿ ) i s feasibl e.
In the rem ai ni ng p art of this sec tion w ed e riv eas o l ution to P1 b y exam i ni ng a l l pos -
s ibl ee qui li bria. F our t yp es of equi li br ia ca n b e di st i ng ui sh e d: Th e pu r e equi li bria, the
eq ui li bria in w hi c h bot h p l a y ers a r e indi￿ere n t abou t thei ra c t ion s and the t w ot y pe so f
eq ui li bria in whic h one of the pla y ers ha s a stri ct prefere nce, while the o the rp l a y e ri s
indi ￿e ren t.
3
3
Note that th e four cate g ories are not m utuall y exclusiv e. E.g. t he pure equil ibrium ￿ = ￿ =1 m a y
w ell b e supp ort ed b yt w o pla y er s who are i n fact indi ￿e re n tb e t w ee n their actions.10
First co nsi de r thos e con tracts w wh i c h induce a n equi libri um i n pure s trategie s. B y
as sum pti on i ti s p ro￿table to im pl em en t the acti on a
H
wi t h at l ea st so m e p o siti v e pro b-
abili t y . Since the ag e n tw i ll only tak e the a c tion a
H
if m onitoring o c curs, the o nl yt yp e
of pure eq uil ibrium wh i c hm a yb ei nduced b y a n optim a l con tract w
￿
is the e quil ibri um
￿ = ￿ = 1.
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. F or the pure acti on s
to co nsti tute a n e quil ibrium it m us t b e that g i v e n the c on tra c t w the pri nci p al pre fers
m onitoring giv en th at the ag e n t tak e s the acti on a
H
. T hi si m pli es that the w a ge s truc ture




￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ) w
N









￿ c=￿ : (1)










. This requi res ￿w
H















) ￿ ￿a : (2)
One m ore c o ndi tion wh i c hn e eds to b e f ul ￿ll ed is that the c on t ra ct is indi viduall y
rationa l f o r the ag en t. T he i ndivi dua l rationalit y cons tr ai n ti s
￿w
H





Le m m a1 If the optimal c ontr ac t in duc es a pur ee qu ilibrium, then w e m ay a ssume w ith-








Pro of: W e sho w tha t the p a y o￿ , asso ci at e dw i th a n y con tract w wh i c h induces a pure
eq ui li brium ,c a n also b e atta i ned b y a co n tra c t w
0
sp eci fying w
0
L







Let the c on tract w i ndu c e the pure equi libri um ￿ = ￿ = 1, then the c on tract m ust sa ti sfy
(1) a nd (2 ). Since i n th e pu r e equi li br i um ￿ = ￿ = 1 the pa y o ￿s a re i ndep enden to f11
w
L
,w em a y set w
L
=0 . This preserv es the equi li brium ￿ = ￿ =1 a n d d o e s not




+ (1 ￿ ￿ )"; w
N





￿ c= ￿) ￿ 0. Th i sc o n tra c tg i v e s th e sa m ep a y o￿ t o the agen t and is












a l s o constrai n t (2) is sa ti s￿ed. T he refore the c on t ra ct w
0
su pp orts the pure
eq ui li brium ￿ = ￿ =1 . N ot e t h at the c on t ra ct w
0
gi v e s the p r inci pa l the sa m ep a y o￿ as
the original con tract w .
Q.E. D.
T he se con d t y p e of equi li brium consists of equi li bria in w hi c h bot h p l a y ers a re indi￿er-
en t ab out thei r acti o ns. Let the pri ncipal m onitor with pro babil it y ￿ , then the ag en ti s in-
di￿ere n tb e t w een his t w oa c tions when ￿￿ w
H



















: ( 4 )
Sim i larly ,l et the a gen tc ho o se the a c tion a
H
wi th proba bi li t y ￿ . T he princ ipal is
wil li n g to rand om i ze , when her p a y o￿ from m on i toring equals her p a y o￿ from n ot m on -













Of course, the con tract w m ust b e suc h that ￿; ￿ 2 [ 0; 1] .
F urtherm or e , the indiv idual ra t ion al it yc o nstrain t of the ag e n ti s￿￿ ￿ w
H
+( 1￿
￿ ) ￿￿ w
L




+( 1 ￿￿ ) a
L
or b y equation (4 ),
￿￿ w
H





Le m m a2 If the optimal c ontr ac t w induc e s an e quil ibrium (￿; ￿ ) in whic h b oth pl ay er s







Pro of: If the o pti m al con tract i nduces a n equi libri um in whi c h b oth pl a y e rs a re i ndif-
fere n t then the p ri nci pa l ’s pa y o￿ i s U
P
(w ; ￿; ￿ )=￿y
H




. T he indiv idua l12
rationa l it y cons trai n t( 6 )i s indep enden to fw
L
.S i nce @ ￿ =@ w
L
￿ 0, the o b j ecti v e function
is dec rea si ng in w
L
. It is there fo re optim a l to set w
L
a s lo wa sp o s s i ble ,i . e. w
L
= 0.
By assu m ption w eh a v e tha t U
P




, whic hi m pl ie s that
w
N
< ￿￿y ￿ a
L




, i tf o l lo ws that w
H
< ￿ ￿ y ￿ ￿y .
No w rewri te the princi pa l ’s pay o￿ as
U
P
(w ) = ￿y
H





































Note t ha t U
P
( w)i si n c reas i ng i n w
N
. C onsequen tly , w
N
sh ould b e set a s large as p oss i ble,
whil e stil l s atisfy ing the c o nstrain ts e ns uri ng tha t ￿; ￿ 2 [ 0 ; 1] . The optim al c on tract,






T w o m o r e t y p e so fe quil ibri a nee d t ob ed i sc us sed. Fi rs t, the equi li brium i n whic h
the princ ipal ha s a stric t pre ferenc ef o rm on i to ri ng (￿ = 1), w hi le the ag e n t is indi￿ere n t
and c ho o ses the a c tion a
H
with a proba bi li t ys m al ler tha n one (￿<1). Ob v ious l y , this
eq ui li brium can not b e susta i ned b y a n optim a l con tract. By incre as i n g the w ag e w
H
only sligh tl y , the a gen tc ho o se s ￿ =1 i ne q uili brium and the princ ipa l ’s pa y o￿ inc reas e s.
Th e fourth t yp e o f equi li brium cons i sts of e quil ibri ai n w h i c h the a gen t has a stri ct
prefe rence for the a c tion a
H
(i .e. ￿ = 1), whil e the princi pa l is indi￿eren t. A con tract w




+ c= ￿. Note that
also i n thi st y p e of equi li br ium the pa y o￿s are indep enden to f w
L
an d w em a y ass um e
that w
L
=0 . W e therefore c o ncl ude tha t an o pti m al c on tract satis￿es the constra i n ts
w
L




+ c=￿ .W ec an n o w deri v e the o pti m al con tract w
￿
.
Prop osit ion 2 i) I f ￿>(￿ a + c)=(a
H





pr in cip a l monitors with a pr ob ab ility l ess than one and the agen t c ho oses t h e high ac tion13
a
H




￿ c . The age nt
do e s not r e c eiv e a r en t.
ii) If ￿ ￿ (￿a + c)=(a
H




) the princip al
monitors wit h a pr ob abil i t y one and the age nt cho o se s the high ac tion a
H
wit h pr ob ability




￿ c. The age ntd o es
r e c eiv e a r en t.
4












+ c= ￿ and c o nseq uen tl y
￿
￿
= 1 . In the optim um the princi pa l is there fo re indi￿ere n tb e t w e en her acti o ns. I t




￿ c=￿ ￿ w
H
i s dec reasing i n w
H
. T he princi pa l ’s
pa y o￿ is, the refore, b oun de db y the co nstrain t w
H
￿ ￿a=￿ o r the indiv idual rationa l it y






+ c=￿. N o te that a binding















) = (2￿ ). This i s larger than o r e qual to
￿a = ￿ if an d only i f ￿ ￿ ( ￿a + c)=(a
H
+ c). Thi s pro v es the prop ositi on .
Q . E . D.







the ag e n tc h o o ses the acti on a
H
with pro babil it yo n e . A sec o nd concl us i on i s that
the e￿c ienc yo fm on i to ri ng pla ys a n i m por t an tr o l e. In o rde rt oi n duc e the ag e n tt o
t a k e the acti on a
H
t h e pri ncipal ha s to m onitor. In the o pti m um m onitoring o ccurs
with proba bi lit y one if the m on i to r ing te c hnology is rel at i v e ly i ne￿c ie n t, i .e . when
￿<(￿a + c)=(a
H





Due to the i ne￿ cie n tm onitoring tec hn ol o gy the princ ipal canno t e xtra c t the wh ol e
surplus from the re lationship and m ust l ea v ea r e n t to th e ag e n t. If the pro babil it yo f
succe s sful m on i to ri ng (￿ )i s larger tha n (￿a + c)=(a
H
+ c) then m onitoring o ccurs w i th
4
It can b e sho wn that the subgam e p erfe ct e qui li br i um o u tcom ei s uni que b yn o ti ng that the re e xi st s















). A n y subgam e p erfec t equil ibri um
m u st the refore b e a s o lutio nt oP 1 .14





￿ c. T he m on i to ri ng te c hnolog y i n this cas e is e￿c ien t eno ugh to ex tra c t the
who l es u r pl us and the agen td o e sn o tr e cei v e a ren t.
4 The Gam e with Delegatio n
In this secti on w e ana l yze t h e gam ei n whic h the princi pa l de legates m on i to r ing to
the s up ervi so r. W e sho w that with de legation the pri ncipal can a ppro x im ate the ￿rst
b est so l ut ion . This i s p oss i ble w he n the princ ipal o￿ e rs an i n ￿ni te w ag e to the ag e n t
when the high action i s o bserv ed and she set s further w ages in s uc haw a y tha t in
eq ui li brium th e m onitoring pro babil it y a pproa c hes ze ro . I ti so b vi o us tha t th e princi pa l
is i ndeed b ette ro ￿ d e legating her m on i to ri ng deci si o n. T he result dep e nds o n the fact
that e xtrem e rew ards a re c redibl e, o n the ri sk n e utra l it y o f the pl a y e rs , an d on the
(sta ndard) a ssum ption th at pla y ers can not s i de-con tract. The las t ass um pt i on wil lb e
r e l a x e d i n t h e n ext secti on .
S i n c e t he ag e n t wil lo n l y tak e the acti on a
H
i f m o n i toring tak e sp l ace, the princi pa l
has to o￿ e ra c on t ra ct to the s up ervi so r whic hi n duc es him to m on i to r. Rec al l that
the con tract of the sup e rvisor can not b e m ade con tingen to nm onitoring itsel f, b ecause
m onitoring is n ot v e ri￿able. Th e pri ncipal can con di tion t he c on tra c t only on the re v e al ed









In the g am e with de legation the pa y o ￿s to the pl a y e rs dep e nd o n th e con tract (w; t )
a nd o n the o utcom e of the subg am e whic h is pla y ed b y the ag en t and the s up erv iso r.
Giv en tha t the s up erv iso r rep orts truthfull y the pa y o￿ functions of the p ri nci pa l , the
sup e rvisor and the a gen t are, re spe c tiv ely
U
P
(w ; t; ￿; ￿ ) ￿ ￿y
H






















. In the fol lo wi ng, ho w ev e r, thes e
t w oc o nd i tio ns w i ll b e ig nore d. The optim al c on t ract
^
t wil l b e such th a t the se t w o c ondi tions a re
autom atical ly satis￿ed .15
U
S
(w; t; ￿ ; ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ t
H
+( 1 ￿￿ ) ￿￿ t
L





( w ; t ; ￿ ; ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ w
H
+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿w
L




￿ (1 ￿ ￿)a
L
;
where ￿ de n otes the pro babil it y that the ag e n tc ho os e s the action a
H
and ￿ represen ts the
prob abil it y that the su p erv iso r m onitors. Th e n giv en a con tract (w; t )aN as h e quil ibri um
in the sim ultaneous m o v eg a m e is a pair ( ^ ￿; ^ ￿ ) suc h that
U
A
(w ; t ; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ )= m ax
￿2 [ 0 ; 1]
U
A
(w ; t ; ￿; ^ ￿ )
U
S




(w; t ; ^ ￿; ￿ ):
W e write N (w; t ) as the set o f Nash eq ui li bria i n the su bgam e induce db y the con tract
(w ;t ). Th e outcom e( w; t ;￿ ;￿ )i ss a i d to b e feasible i f it s atis￿es the fo l lo wing con strain ts :
U
A
(w ; t; ￿; ￿ ) ￿ 0
U
S
(w ; t; ￿; ￿ ) ￿ 0














Sim il ar l y ,w e cal l a con tract (w; t ) feasibl e if there e xists a n equi li brium (￿; ￿ ) 2 N (w; t )
suc h tha t the o utcom e( w; t ;￿ ; ￿ ) is feas i ble. A subga m e p erfe ct equil ibri um outcom eo f
the ga m ei sa s o l ution ( ^ w;
^
t ; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ )t oP 2 .
P 2: m ax
( w; t ;￿;￿ )
U
P
(w; t ; ￿; ￿ )
s: t: (w; t ;￿ ;￿ ) is feasible ,
where w ew i ll cal l the con tract ( ^ w;
^
t ) a n optim al c on tr a ct.
W e der iv e the b est resp ons e s o f the ag e n t and the sup ervi so r i n the si m ul ta ne ou s
m o v eg a m e induc ed b ya c on tract (w; t ). Giv en tha t the sup ervi so r m on i to rs w i th a






Le m m a3 Without loss of ge ner a l ity w e ma y assume that t h e sol ution (^ w;
^
t ; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ ) to P 2




=￿ a=(￿ ^ ￿ ), i.e . in e q uilibrium the age nt is indi￿er en t b etw e en the









< ￿a=(￿ ^ ￿ ), then the a gen t’s
uniq u e b est resp onse i st op l a y a
L
,i .e. ￿ = 0. The con tract ^ w canno t b e optim al b y




> ￿a = (￿ ^ ￿ ), the n the
ag e n t’s uniq ue b est resp onse i s to pla y a
H
, i. e. ^ ￿ = 1. T he s tr ict pre ferenc e for action
a
H
im pl ie s that @￿ = @ w
H
= @ ￿ =@ w
N

















= ￿(1 ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ ). This im pli es tha t i fw el o w er ^ w
H
and ra i se
^ w
N
a t a p r opor t ion al rate o f (1 ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ )= (￿ ^ ￿ ) the n b o th the princ ipa l ’s a nd the a gen t’s
pa y o￿ do not c han ge. W e the refore ca n lo w e r^ w
H
t o ￿ a = ( ￿ ^ ￿ )+ ^ w
L
a n d r a i s e ^ w
N
b y a n
app ropriate am oun t in order to c reate a new con tract w
0
. If the c om bination ( ^ w;
^
t; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ )




t; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ ) is a solution to P2 .
Q.E. D.
Gi v en the c on tra c t( w; t ) and that the ag e n t tak e s the acti on a
H
wit h pro babili t y ￿ ,
the s up ervi so r’ s b est resp o nse dep ends o n the di ￿e rence in pa y o￿ s b et w ee nm onitoring
and not m on i to ri ng .
Le m m a4 Without loss of ge ner a l ity w e ma y assume that t h e sol ution (^ w;
^
t; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ ) to P 2












, i.e . in e quil i br iu m the sup er vi s or is indi￿er en t
ab out m on itor in g.
Pro of: Le t the optim al c on t ra ct
^








< c + ￿t
N
t hen
the su p erv iso r has a stric t pre ferenc ef or n ot m onitoring. Si nc en o m onitoring i ndu c es
the a gen t to pla y ￿ =0 , t h e con tract ( ^ w;
^
t ) ca nnot b e o pti m al b y ass um ption. Let the
optim al con tra c t
^












then the s up erv iso r h as
a stric t pre ferenc e for m onitoring ( ^ ￿ = 1). Note tha t the s up ervi so r can only ha v ea
stric t pre ferenc ef or m onitoring i fh i si ndivi dua l rationa l it y con strain ti s not bi nd i ng .17








o n l ysl igh tl y then ( ^ ￿; ^ ￿ )








and create a new
con tract t
0
for whic h the com bination ( ^ w; t
0
; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ )i sa l s o feas i ble, whil er esu l ting i na
higher pa y o￿ to the p ri nci pa l . The com bi na ti on ( ^ w;
^
t; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ )c ou l d there fo re not ha v e
b een a solution to P2 .
Q.E. D.
F rom le m m a 3 an d 4 i t f ol lo ws tha t the o pti m al con tract ( ^ w;
^
t )i sac o n tract whic h
induce sam i xed e quil ibri um i n the s i m ul tan e ou s m o v eg a m e. Th e optim a l con tract ( ^ w;
^
t )





























Note that the com bi na ti on ( ^ w;
^
t ; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ ) can o nl y b e a so l ution to P2 i f it satis￿es the
indi vidual rationalit y constra i n ts fo r the a gen t and the sup e rvisor, whic h are resp ecti v e ly ,
￿￿ ￿ w
H












+ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿t
L
+ ( 1 ￿ ￿￿ ) t
N
￿ ￿ c: (9)




b y o￿ering a
c ontr ac t (w; t ) which sp e ci￿e s a wage w
H
te ndin g to in￿ nity and a w age w
N
appr o achin g
a
L
.A s a r e sult the princip al c an achiev e a hig her p ay o￿ when s he de le ga te s m o n itor in g.












) = ( w
H
￿ ￿ a ),
t
H
= c=￿ an d w
H
> ￿ a=￿ . Thi sc on tra c t induce sa m ixe d equi li br i um (￿; ￿ )=
(1; ￿a = (￿w
H
)). The read e rm a yc he c k that the co m bi n ati on ( w; t ; 1 ; ￿ a =( ￿w
H
)i sf e a-
sibl eb y noting that the indivi dua l rationa l it yc o nstrain ts are sa ti s￿ e d in equali t y . The18
princ ipal’s pa y o￿ i s U
P




￿ (￿a c)= (￿w
H
). I fw e let w
H
te nd to in￿nit y






T w oc o n c lusions can b e dra wn from the propos i tion: De legating m onitoring is prof-
itable for the princ ipal and th e re do e s n ot ex ist an o pti m al con tract. W ew i ll com m e n t
on b o th resul ts .
Th e re a r et w o rea sons wh y the pri ncipal c an ac hie v e a higher pa y o￿ b y dele g ating
m onitoring. The ￿rst re a son conce rn s the creation of ince n ti v es. T he pri nc ipal ha s to g i v e
inc en ti v e s to induce the acti on a
H
a nd, at the s am e tim e ,t o i ndu c em onitoring. When
the pri ncipal c on tro l st h e m onitoring tec hno l og y , there is only the con tract w thro ugh
whic h the pri nc ipal c an r e gu l a te b oth ince n tiv es. By dele g ating the m on i to ri ng pro cess
to the sup e rvisor, s he ha s t w o sets of con tracts for cre at i ng appro pri a te ince n tiv es. F rom
the e quil ibri um c o nditi on ( 7) w e see tha t w i th del ega ti o n the princ ipal uses the con tract
t to regu l ate the ince n tiv es f o r the ag e n t and the c on tra c t w for cre at i ng i ncen tiv es to
m onitor.B yd e legating m onitori n g the pri ncipal decouple s the t w ot yp es of i ncen tiv es
and can regulate them m ore accuratel y .
A sec o nd reaso n i s that in the gam ew i th out del ega ti o n the pri ncipal c a nnot com m i t




i s larg e r tha n w
N
.A s a r e su l t an optim al




. This l ac ko fc om m itm en t doe s n ot o c c ur wh e nm onitoring
is del ega te d to the s up erv iso r. In the g am ew i th dele g ation the sup e rvisor m ak e s the
dec ision c o nce rning the rev el at ion of e vide nce. H is deci si on do e s no t dep end on the
con tract w ,l ik e in the ga m ew i tho ut del ega ti o n, bu t only on th e con tra c t t. The princi pa l




a nd use ac a rrot and stic k a pproa c h to disci pli ne
the ag e n t.
P r opos i tion 3, ho w e v e r, also te ll s us that a n optim al c on tract ( ^ w;
^
t )d o e s not exi st .

















canno t b e o btained in eq ui li brium .I tw ould req ui re that the ag e n tc ho oses the acti on a
H19
with proba bi li t y one, whi le m on i to ri ng do es no t o ccur. Th e re do e s not ex ist a con tract
(w ; t)w h i c h induce ss u c ha ne quil ibri um . T he equi li brium (￿; ￿ )= ( 1 ; 0) can only b e
app ro x im ated b y a con tract w hi c hs p e ci ￿e sa w
H
tending to i n ￿ni t y .
Th e result is sim i lar to Border a nd Sob el (19 87). Border and So b el a nalyz eam o del in
whic h a princi pa l tri es to extract a n ag e n t’ s endo wm en t, w hi le this endo wm e n ti sp r i v ate
inform ati on . Optim a l pol ic ies in their m o del i n v olv e rew a rdi n g the a gen t for tru t hf ul
r e po r t ing. They dem o nstrate, ho w e v e r, tha t i fr e w a rds to the ag e n t a re not b ounded
ex o genous l y ,a n o p t im al p ol icy do e sn o t e x ist. The pri nci pa l w ould lik et o m o nit or wi th
an in￿nite ly s m al l p robabili t y ,w h i le pro m ising i n ￿ni tel y large re w a rds when the au di t
con￿rm s the rep o rt of the agen t. The high re w ar d i n duc es the agen tt o t e ll the truth.
Th e result tha t o￿ering an ev er hi g her w ag e w
H
be ne￿ts the princi pa l is not reali stic.
It pro m pts us to question the a ssum pti o ns of the m od e l. I n the l ite ra ture t w om o di￿c a-
tions ha v eb e en pro p o sed. F irst, Border a nd So b el argue tha t it is unreali st i c to ass um e
that the pri n c ipal can prom i se i n￿nite rew a rds. They argu e that in realit y resou rc es
are li m it ed a nd this a l so holds f o r the princ ipal. They there f or e p r opos e a n exog e no us
upp e rb ound on w ag es. Thi s pro c edure, ho w e v er, is ra the r a dh o c ,b e c a use it c reates the
prob l em of ￿ndi n g a plaus i ble upp e rb ound. Sec o nd, Mo okherje e a nd P ng (198 9) co n test
the pl a usibi lit y of risk neutrali t yi n th e con tex t of the m o del. T he ys h o w that w i th o nl y
as l igh t deg r ee of ri sk a v e rs i o n in￿ni tely hi gh w ag e s are no l o nger o pti m al.
W e p rop o se a third a pproac h a nd in t r odu c e the p os sibi li t y of col lusion b et w een the
princ ipal a nd the s up erv iso r. The next secti o n arg ues tha t this is a natura l e xtension
of th e m o del .A s w e wil l see, th e th r ea t of coll us i o n cre at e s an endo genous upp erb o und
onw ag e pro p o sals and its u l tim a te e￿ect is ther efore sim il a r to B ord e r and So b el ’s
as sum pti o n of an ex o genous upp erb o und on rew ards. T he exte ns i on can therefore also
b e see na sam ore re al istic i n terpre ta ti o n o f Border and Sob e l’s a d h o c upp erb o und on
w ag e s.20
5 C o l lusion b et w een P ri ncipal and Sup ervi sor
Co nsi de r a con tract w hi c h a ppro xi m ates the ￿rst b est so l ution. This m eans tha t the w age
w
H
i s larg e ,w h i le the w ag e w
N
is close to a
L
. The prob abil it y tha t m on i to ri ng o c curs is
sm all , but strictl y p ositiv e. N o w supp ose that m on i to r ing do es indee do c cur and that i t
rev eals that the a gen t’s a c tion is a
H
. If the sup ervi so r rev eals thi si nfo rm at i on , t he n the
princ ipal has to pa y the agen t the w ag e w
H
.I f the princ ipa l c a n con vi nc et h e sup e rvisor
not to re v e a l his inform ation, the n she o nl y has to pa y the w ag e w
N





F or c on tra c ts whic h app ro x im ate the ￿rs t b e st so l ution thi s di￿erenc ei sl a rge a nd the
princ ipal’s wil lingness to pa y to prev en t rev el at i o n is high. W es a y tha t i n this case the
princ ipal ha s a stron g inc en ti v e to collude wi th the sup e rvi s or to prev en tr e v e lation.
Th e i dea of coll us i o n is m od e led a s foll ows. After stag e 5 of the g am e the sup e rvisor
rev eals the ev idence to the pri nc ipal. The princ ipa l can the n o￿er the su p erv iso r a
bribe b for not rev eali ng the ev idence . If the sup ervi s or acc epts the bri be , then c ol lusion
o c curs. Co l lusion, h o w ev er, is c o stl y .A s a rational fo r this a ssum ption co nsi de r that the
brib e should not b e dete cted a nd has to b e tra nsferr ed in s te al th. In acc o rdance w i th
Tirole (19 92) w e as sum e that thi s cos t is p rop o rti o nal to the s i ze of the brib e. Th us, the
cost o f bribi ng can b e e xpressed b y a tra nsfer para m eter k 2 (0; 1) w i th t h e fo l lo wing
in terpretation. Wh e n the princi pa l sends a brib e o f b m o net a ry units, th e sup e rvisor
rec eiv es o nl y a n equi v al en to fkb m onetary un i ts. It is a ssum ed that the v alue o f k is
com m o n kno wle d ge.
Note that coll us i on c a n only in v olv e the c o nce al m e n t o f evi dence, not the arti￿ci al





is conceale d. S i nce with del ega ti on a con tract a ppro xi m ating the ￿rs t b est






, the pri ncipal wi ll t ypi ca l ly ha v ea ni n terest i n bribing
when the evi dence sho ws a
H
. In fact wh e nt h e evi de nce sho ws a
L
, the princi pa l s tri ctl y
prefe rs thi s t ob er e v ealed. A t ￿rst sigh t this m ay induce the s up ervi so r to threaten
not to rev eal the e vide nce a
L
,i f he is not paid m or e than the con tract sp eci ￿es. Suc h
threats, ho w ev er, are not c redibl e.21
Co l lusion b et w ee n the princi pa l a nd the sup e rvisor o cc urs only i fi ti s pro￿tab l e for
b o th si de s. The bri be b , ther efore, has to b e su c h that b o th t h e sup e rvisor an d the
princ ipal a re w i ll ing to coll ud e .W e calcul a te the m ax im um brib e, b
ma x
, the princi pa l is
wil li n g to giv e an d the m i nim a l bri be , b
m i n
, the s up ervi so r i s wil li n g to acce pt.








. This m e a ns that








￿ b> 0. The












Th e s up ervi so r acce pts a brib e if thi si s pro￿ta bl et o h i m . Sinc e a bri b e of size b is







) : (1 1)




there do es not exi s tab r ib e b ￿ 0 for whic h b oth the
princ ipal and the s up ervi so r are wil li ng to coll ude.
6
As a cons e quence coll us i o n wil l not
tak e place. A con tract i s, there fo re ,c ol lusion- pro o f i fi ts a t i s￿ e s the coll usion -pro ofness










with K ￿ (1 ￿ k )=k .
Prop osit ion 4 F or any c ontr ac t which is n ot c ol lusion- pr o of the p rinc ip al i sw e akly b et -
t e ro ￿p r op osin g a c ont r act which is c ol l usion-pr o of. The r ee x i s t s, the r efor e, an optimal
c ontr ac t, w hich is c o l l usion- pr o of.
Pro of: Co nsider a c on tra c t( w; t )w h i c h do es no t s atisfy the c ol lusion- pro o fne ss c on -
stra i n t. Then it i s com m on kno wle dg e b et w ee n th e pla y ers that collusi on o c curs. All
pla y ers therefore kno w tha t the sta te of the w or l dHw i ll n ot o cc ur. This im pli es that the
6
W ea s sum et h a t when th e s up er v isor i si ndi￿er en tb e t w ee n acc epting and not acc epting the bri be
he do e s not acce pt the br i be b . Thi s e nsur es e xi st enc e of an equil ibrium .22
rel ev an tw a ge com bi na ti on wh e n the a gen t tak e s the a ct ion a
H





b b e the brib e whic ha c com pan i es the coll usion , the n the p r inci pa l i sw eakly b ette ro ￿


















Note that i f









) r e s u l t si nthe sam ep a y o ￿ to the ag en t and s up ervi so r.
Q.E. D .
Co nsider the t w o p olar cases k = 0 and k =1 . I f k = 0 then coll usion is i n￿ ni tel y
costly and wil ln o to c cur. The m od e li s i den ti cal to the m ode l a naly zed in the previ ou s
secti on , i n whi c h the sup e rvisor con trols the m onitoring tec hno l o gy and the princi pa l h as
no p ossibil it yo fb r i bing. If k = 1, coll us i o n is c o stle ss . T hi si m plie s that the princi pa l can
prev en t the re v e lation o f e videnc ea tn oa d d i tiona l c o st. Coll us i o n and the subseque n t




. W i th





There is no dire ct c om m it m en t e￿ect fro m del ega ti ng m on i toring to the sup ervi s or. In
this re spe c t the case k = 1 resem ble st h e v e rsion o f the m od e li nw h i c ht h e princi pa l
do es not de legate m onitoring. Ho w e v e r, t h e fa c t that the princ ipal can r eg ul a te the
inc en ti v e sf or m on i to ri ng and the action a
H
m ore e￿ec tiv ely w he n dele g ating m onitoring
stil l rem ai ns .
A s ubga m e p erfe ct e quil ibri u m outcom es of t h e ga m ew i th coll us i o n is a solution to
the foll o wi ng optim i zation p roble m :
P 3: m ax U
P
(w ; t; ￿; ￿ )
s:t : (w; t ;￿ ;￿ ) i sf ea si ble
(w; t ) is coll us i o n-pro of.
A con tra c t( ^ w;
^
t ) fo r whi c h the m axim um i sa c hie v e d is call ed an op t im al co n tra c t. Be fore
dete rm ini ng a soluti o n to P3 w e ￿rs t pro v e the fo l lo wing propos i tion.
7
The br i be kb should b e adde d to the sup e rvi s or’ sw a ge t
0
N
,s i n c ei tm i gh t b e the brib e kb , whic h
m a k es t h e su pe rv i sor’s c o n tr a ct i nd i vidua l rati onal.23
Prop osit ion 5 F or any k 2 (0 ; 1] the pr in cip al c an achie ve a strict ly highe r p ayo￿ by
del e gatin g mon itor ing t h an w h e n she mon i to r sh e r se lf.














). Co nsi de r the feas i ble o utc om e
( w
￿




) i n t he ga m ew i th dele g ation, where t =( c= ￿; 0 ; 0 ). T he princi pa l ’s pa y o￿
as so c iated with thi s outcom e is equal t o the subga m ep e rfec t equi libri um pa y o￿ of t h e
















). N ot e ,h o w-
ev er, tha t for the con tract (w
￿
;t ) the coll us i o n-pro ofness constra i n t is not bi nding. W e
can there fo re raise w
H
and dec reas e w
N
,w h i le k eepi n g the ag en t’s pa y o ￿ consta n t. This
pro c edure wil l caus e ￿ =￿ a = ( ￿w
H
) to fall and will incre a se the pri nci pa l ’s pay o￿ . I t
foll o w s th at t h e pri nc ipal’ sp a y o￿ is stri ctl yh i g her in th e ga m ew i th del ega ti o n tha n in
the ga m e w i tho ut del ega ti on .
Q . E . D.
P r opos i tion 5 shows that the princi pa l c a n attain a hi g her pa y o￿ b y dele g ating m on -
itori ng e v en when there exi st e xtrem ec ol lusion p os si bi li tie s( k ! 1 ). In the se c a ses the
com m itm e n t e￿ec to fd e legation is v ery sm all . T he fa c t tha t the princi pa l can b ett er
regulate the ince n tiv es, ho w e v e r, rem ai n s. This causes dele g ati o n to b e ev en pro￿ta bl e
when the com m i tm en te ￿e ct do es no t ex ist.
Prop osit ion 6 i) If ￿> (￿a ￿ Kc ) = j a
H
￿ Kc j then unde r the o pt i mal c o nt r act (^ w;
^
t )
the sup er v isor m on itor s with a pr ob abilit y le s s than one and t he ag en t tak es t he ac tion




￿ c. Ne ither the age nt
nor the sup ervisor r e c eiv es a r en t.
ii) I f ￿ ￿ (￿a ￿ Kc ) = j a
H
￿ Kc j an d K ￿ ￿= (1 ￿ ￿ ) the n u nder t he optimal c ont r act
(^ w;
^
t ) the sup er visor monitors with pr o b ab ility one and the ag ent take s the action with




￿ c.T h e age nt
r e c eiv es a r en t, w hi l e the sup er vi s or do es n ot.
iii) I f ￿ ￿ (￿ a ￿ Kc ) = j a
H
￿ Kc j an d K> ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) then the n unde r the optimal24
c ontr ac t (^ w;
^
t ) t h e sup er v isor monitors with pr ob abil ity on e and t h e age nt tak es the ac tion





sup er v isor r e c eive s a r e nt, whil e t he ag ent do es no t .
Th e pro of of thi s p r opos i tion cons i s t s of se v e ra l steps and is re se rv e d for the a pp endix.
The pro p o si tion sho ws that for the o pti m al con tra c t the agen tc h o o ses the a c tion a
H
w i th
prob abil it y one. There are thre et yp e s o f optim a l con tracts. If m on i to ri ng i s e￿c ie n t
(i. e. ￿>(￿a ￿ Kc ) = j a
H
￿ Kc j ) then the p ri nci pa l can se t con tra c ts in suc haw a y that
in the sim ultaneous m o v eg a m e the sup erv isor m onitors with a proba bi lit yl ess tha n o ne.
The i ndivi dua l rationa l it y constra i n t of the ag en t and the sup ervi s or are binding i n this
case.
When m on i to ri ng i sl e ss e￿ cie n t, m o nit or i ng m us t o c cur wi th proba bi li t yo n e . T o
induce the ag e n tt oc ho ose the action a
H
wi th proba bi li t yo n e , the princi pa l has to l ea v e
a ren t to ei ther the sup ervi s or or the ag e n t. When c ol lusion i sn o t v e ry c o stly (i .e.
K < ￿= (1 ￿ ￿)), the pri ncipal prefe rs to le a v e thi s ren t to the ag en t. In the other case






Recal l tha t a si m il ar re su l tw a s o btaine d when w e deri v e d the optim a l co n tra c ti nt h e
ga m e withou t de legation. Al s o there the e￿c ienc yo fm on i to ri ng dete rm i ne dw h e ther
the princi pa l w as ab l e to a ppropriate th e en tire surplus cre at e db y the a c tion a
H
. N ote
ho w ev er, tha t t he m onitoring tec hno l og y d oe s n ot ne ed to b e as e ￿ci en ta s i n the ga m e
withoutd e le g ation in order to extract the whole surplus, s i nce (￿ a ￿ Kc ) = j a
H
￿ Kc j <
(￿a + c)=(a
H
+ c) for a l l K ￿ 0. Th i si s due to the e ￿e c tt h at with dele g ation the
princ ipal can b ette rr e gu l at e i ncen tiv es.
Prop osit ion 7 The pri n cip al’s m ax imum p ay o￿ is de cr e as in g with the c ost of c o l l usion
k .
Pro of: F or the so l ution ( ^ w;
^




> 0 and tha t the collusi on -
pro ofness c o nstrain ti s bindi ng . By de creasing the v ariable k the coll usion -pro ofness25
constra i n ti sr e l ax e d, wh i c hi ncreases t h e pri nci pa l ’s pa y o￿ .
Q.E. D.
Th e i n tuiti on b e hind p rop o siti on 7 b ecom e sc l ear when o ne notes that an al terna ti v e
w a y of i n terpre ting the tran sfe r tec hno l o gy para m eter k i st o v iew i ta st h e d e gr e eo f
com m itm e n t. I f k i ss m all then the princi pa l can c om m it to ha nding o ut l a rge rew a rds
if it i s observ ed tha t the a gen t to o k the high action. A larger k then re du c es the set of
con tracts to whi c h the pri ncipal c a n com m it. I n term so fc o m m i tm e n t the pro p os i tion
then sta te s that the princ ipa l can attain a hi gh e rp a y o￿ when s he is a bl et o c om m it to
a l a rger set of c on tra c ts .
6 C o l lusion b et w een A gen t and Sup erv isor
One ca n exte nd t he m o del further b y a ddi ng another p o ssibi lit yo fc ol lusion. By a l lo wing
the agen tt oc ol lude wi th the sup e rvisor the s e t o f coll us i o n-pro of con tracts i s further
restri cted. Le tt h e agen tb ea b l et o m ak e u se of the s am e bri bing te c hnology a s the
princ ipal. A t a prop ortiona l cos t k he can se n d bri be s to the sup e rvisor. A ga i nw e
d o n o t a n a l yze the b arga i ning g am e , but s i m pl y a ssum et h a t i ft h e re ex ists a surplus
from col luding, coll us i on t ak es place. W e do n ot ana l yze ho w the s urpl us i s divi ded o v er
the three p l a y ers. F or si m pli ci tely as sum e that the s up ervi so r can o nl y ask one p l a y er
for a coll us i o nairy o￿er.
8
In this case the ince n tiv es of the pri ncipal and the agen t are
m utua l ly e xcl us i v e .I f the ev idenc e sho w s that the ag en t’s action w as a
H
then only the





. Lik ewise, if the evi dence i s a
L
, then o nl y the a gen t b ene￿ts from the
conceal m en to fe v i dence .
8
The a nalysi s is not c hanged w h en one ass um es m ore g e ner a l bargai ni ng s i tuations in whic ht h e
agen t and principal c an m ak e alter na ti ng bids to the sup ervisor. The im p ortan t assum ption i s that i f
gi v en the c o n tr a ct ( w; t ) ther e exi s ts an ini tial surplus from col luding the n this l e ads t o side-pa ym en ts
in e qui li br i um .26
W e deri v e the c ol lusion- pro o fne s s constra i n t of the agen t. B y coll uding the ag e n t
prev en ts the s up ervi so r from re v e al ing the ev idenc e a
L
. Thisi m pl ie st h a th er e cei v e s the
w ag e w
N
instead of the w ag e w
L




















Equation (13) is the coll us i o n-pro ofness c o nstrain t with re spe c t to the ag e n t. With-
out l o s so fg e neralit yw em a y as sum e tha t the optim a l con tract sa ti s￿ e s the collusi on -
pro ofness c o nstrain t with resp ect to the agen t. Supp os e the optim a l co n tra c t( ^ w;
^
t )
d o e s n ot sa t i s fy the cons trai n t. Since it is in the i n tere s t o f the a gen t an d the su-
p ervi s or to coll ud e , bri bing wil lo c c ur. Th i sm ean s tha t instead of pa ying the w age












). A c on -



























) m ust there fo re also b e optim al . N ot e that the con tract s atis￿es the
coll usion -pro ofness con strain t.
A subga m e p erfec te q uili brium o utc om ei sac o n tra c t( w; t ) a nd an eq uil ibrium pa i r





(w; t ;￿ ;￿ )
s:t: (w ; t; ￿; ￿ ) i sf e a sibl e
(w; t ) is c ol lusion-pro o f w. r.t. the princi pa l
(w; t ) i sc o l lusion-pro o f w. r.t. the a gen t.
Th e prev ious s e cti o n sho w e d tha t o pti m ali t y requi res that the agen tc ho o ses the action
a
H
w i th probab i li t y one. In equi li brium the sup e rvisor d o es th e refore no t observ e the
action a
L
,w h e nh e m on i tors . This im pl ie s tha t in equi li brium the pri nci p al nev er needs
to pa y the s up ervi so r th e w ag e t
L
. Cons e quen tly , she ca n s e t t
L
as large as she w an ts
without a￿ecti ng the pa y o￿ of the pla y ers. It fo l lo ws th at the princi pa l ca n costle ss l y27
prev en tc ol lusion b e t w ee n the a gen t a nd the sup e rvisor. She o￿ e rs th e s up erv iso r a large
rew ard if he o bserv es tha t the agen t’ s acti on w as a
L
. The rew a rd is set i n suc ha w a y ,
that there do es not exi st a s urpl us b et w ee n the ag e n t and the sup ervi s or when the y









Prop osit ion 8 A ll o w ing t he p ossibil ity of c ol lusion b e twe e n the ag ent a n d the sup er v isor
do e s n ot a￿e ct th e m ax imum p ay o￿ the pr in cip al c an ac hieve . As a c onse q uen c e the
pr in cip a li sb ette r o￿ by d el e g ating monitoring to a sup er vi s or.
Pro of: Let ( ^ w;
^
t ) b e the optim al c on tra c tw i tho ut the p o ssibi li t y of collusi on b e t w e en
the a gen t a nd th e sup e rvisor. I n the s i m ul ta ne ou s m o v eg a m ei nd uc ed b y the con tract
( ^ w ;
^
t) th e a gen t c ho o ses the a c tion a
H
w i th pro babil it yo n e , i.e . ^ ￿ =1 . N o w co nsi der



































; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ )
is feasibl e a nd coll usion -pro of an d giv es a l l pla y ers the sa m ep a y o￿ as the o utc om e
( ^ w;
^
t ; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ ) i n t h e g am e without the p o ssibi li t yo fc o l lusion b e t w ee n the ag e n t and the
sup e rvisor.
Q.E. D .
7 C on clus ion
In this pa p er w e a naly zed a princi pa l -a gen tm o del with the p os si bili t yo f m on i to ri ng .
W eh a v e sho wn that if the deci sion to m on i tor and the acti o n of the ag e n t a re tak en
sim ultaneous l y then t h e princi pa l ga i ns b y del ega ti ng m on i to ri ng . Del ega ti on m a yb e
b ene￿ci a l b ecause of t w o e￿ects. First, when the m o nit o r and e ￿ ort dec ision are tak en
sim ultaneous l y , the princi pa l m us t create ince n tiv es to i ndu c e b oth m onitoring and e￿o rt.
By em plo yi ng a n e xternal m on i to r sh e has a n e xtra con tract t oh e r disp o sal and can
b etter regulate ince n tiv es f or m onitoring and e￿o r t. W ec al l this the inc en ti v e e￿ec to f
del ega ti on .28
A second e ￿e ct wh i c hm a ym ak ei t b ene￿c ial to de legate m onitoring i sc om m itm en t.
If the evi dence obta i ned b ym onitoring i s priv ate inform ati on an d c a n be c on c ealed, then
the princi pa l can com m it to a larg e r rang e o f con tracts when she em pl o ys an inde p ende n t
sup e rvisor. W e para m eteri zed the de g ree o f c om m itm en tb yi n tro ducing the p ossibil it y
of c o l lusionb e t w een the princ ipa l a nd the s up ervi so r a nd sho w ed th at the princi pa l ’s
m axi m um pa y o ￿ is indee di nc reasing with the degree of com m i tm en t. This second e ￿e ct
is the com m itm e n t e￿ect of d e le g ation.
As a l o gic a l exte ns i on w e all o w ed the ag e n tt o c ol lude wi th the sup ervi so r in a sim i lar
fas hi o n a s the princ ipal and sho w ed tha t the pri nc ipal can costlessly prev en ts u c hc ol lu-
sion. This result c a n b e seen a s an ex am ple o f the ￿rst the m ei n T i ro l e (199 2), whic h
cl ai m s that \ U nder som ec o ndi tion, there is no loss in de si gn i ng orga ni zations whi c hd o
not lea v es c o p e for coll us i o n" (p.157 ). The form of c ol lusion is, ho w e v e r, rather sim ple.
Co l lusion tak e sp l ace after th e actions ha v eb e en tak e n a nd the m on i to r ing evi dence h as
b een o btaine d. When the sup e rvisor and a gen t can coll u de b efore taking their acti on s
t h e n m o r e so phi st i cated coll us i on s c he m es m a ye m erge whic hw i ll b e cos t ly to pre v e n t.
App endix : Pro of of Prop o s ition 6
In order to c hara ct eriz eas o l ution to P 3 note that the proble mi s iden ti cal t o proble m
P2 , ex cept for th e a dditi on of the coll us i o n-pro ofness c o nstrain t. The coll usion -pro ofness




. As a result prop o -
siti on 3 wi ll no l o nger hold a nd a n optim al c on t ra ct do es indeed exi st. Concerni ng the
le m m a’ s3a n d 4w e can sa y that t h e form e rl em m aw i ll sti ll ho l d, w hi le the latter do es
nol o nger need to h old.
Le m m aA . 1 Wi th o u t loss of g en er alit y we m ay assume that the solu tion to P3 s at i s￿ es




)=￿ a ,i .e . the age nt i s indi￿er en t i ne qu ilibrium b et we en the action a
H
and the act io n a
L

































Pro of: F or i) see the pro of o f l em m a 3 and n ote that the pro c edure of reduci ng w
H
and incre a sing w
N
wil l not vi ol a te the c ol lusion-pro o f ne ss c o nstrain t .T h e refore w eh a v e




) = ￿ a .
F or ii )c o nside r the pro of of l em m a 4 a nd n ote tha t lo w e ring t
H
m igh tv iolate the
coll usion -pro ofness constra i n t and thi s caus e sl em m a 4 to fail . The v ariable t
L
can b e
lo w ered without a￿ e cti ng the coll us i o n-pro ofness c o nstrain t.
T o pro v ei ii ) note ￿rst that @ ￿=@ w
N
= @ ￿ =@ w
N
= @￿ = @w
L
= 0 and @ ￿=@ w
L
￿ 0.
C o nsi de r the com bi na ti on ( ^ w;
^
t ; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ ) wit h^ w
L
> 0 whi c hi sf e a sibl ea n dc ol lusion-p ro o f,


















^ ￿ ) ￿ ^ ￿ ^ w
L
= ( 1 ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ ) i s also feasible and coll us i o n-pro of, with ￿
0

















t ; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ ). F urtherm ore, w e




















+ c= ￿. I n bot h cas e s the
sup e rvisor’s indiv idua l ra ti o nali t yc o nstrain ti ss a t i s￿ e df o r all t
N
￿ 0. S i nc e the prin-
ci pa l ’s pa y o￿i sd e creasing i n t
N
and l o w eri ng t
N
do es no t cause the coll usion -pro ofness
constra i n tt o b ev iolated, w e kno wt h a ta c o n tract sp ec ify ing t
N
> 0 ca nnot b e optim al.
Q.E. D.
F rom the ￿rs t t w o pa rts of l em m aA . 1i t foll o w s that an o pti m al c on tra c td o e sn o t
nec ess aril y induce a n equi libri um i n the s i m ultaneo us m o v eg a m ei n whic h bot h t h e
ag e n t and the sup e rvisor are i ndi￿eren t abou t their a c tions in eq uili brium a nd pl a ya
m i xed s trategy . T he third pa rt of t he l e m m at e ll s us tha t fo r a n optim a l con tract the
age n tg ets punished a s s e v e rel y as p os si ble when it is rev ealed that he to ok the action
a
L
.F urtherm or e ,i ti so p t i m al not to pa y t he s upe r v iso r when he d o es no t sho wa n y
e v idence .
An i m p o rtan t o bserv ation i s tha t the c ol lusion- pro o fne ss c o nstrain tm u st b e binding
at the optim um .30
Prop osit ion A.1 F or the optimal c on tr act (^ w;
^
t ) t h ec ol l usion-pr o ofne s sc on str aint is
bin ding.
Pro of: Ac co r di ng to l em m aA .1 w eh a v et w o cases to cons i der. Ca se 1: The solution
to P3i ss u c h tha t the sup ervi s or has a unique b e st resp o nse to m on i to r. In this case i t
dire ctl y foll ows from the pro of o f lem m a A: 1 that the co l lusion-pro ofness co nstrain ti s
bindi ng . C ase 2 : T he soluti o n to P3 is su c h tha t a m i xed eq ui li brium is pla y ed in the
sim ultaneous m o v e gam e. Co nsi der a c on tract (w; t ), whic h induce sa m i xed eq ui li brium ,
i. e. ￿ =￿ a=(￿w
H
). I f the coll usion- pro ofness constra i n t is not binding, the nw e can
inc reas e w
H
and lo w e r w
N
. B y inc reas i ng w
H
and lo w eri ng w
N
i n suc haw a y tha t the









T h e c o n t r ac ti st h e refore not optim a l if the coll us i o n-pro ofness co nstrain ti s not
bindi ng .
Q.E. D .
Le m m aA . 2 Wi th o u t loss of gen er al ity ,w em ay assume that the o pt i mal c o nt r act (^ w;
^
t )






























+ c. If the latter ca se holds, t he n the su p erv iso r is indi￿ere n t
be t w e en his acti o ns. Si nce ￿ 2 [0; 1], i tm ust b e that ei ther t
L
> c=￿ ^ t
H
￿ c=￿ ,o r
t
L
< c=￿ ^ t
H
￿ c=￿ . Cons i der a feas i ble and coll us i o n-pro of o utcom e( w; t ; ￿; ￿ )w i th
t
H
￿ c=￿ and t
L
>c = ￿ .T ak e t
0
L
= 0 and t
0
H






￿ c ). Then the o utc om e
( w; t
0








; 0), is feasi ble and coll usion- pro of a nd g i v e s the princi pa l
the sa m ep a y o￿ .
Q.E. D.
Le m m aA . 3 If t h ec om b ination (^ w;
^
t; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ ) with ^ ￿ =1 is a solut ion to P3 t h e n it must
hold that ^ ￿ =1 .
9




.S i nc e a
L
> 0i tf o llo ws that t he
cons trai n t w
N
￿ 0 wil l not b e vio lated as lo ng as the c on tract w i si ndivi dual r a ti onal .31
Pro of: W e pro v eb y con trad i cti o n. S upp o se that the com bi na ti on ( ^ w;
^
t ; ^ ￿ ; ^ ￿ )i s a solution
to P 3 with ^ ￿<1a n d ^ ￿ =1 . F i rs t n ote that b y a ssum ption ^ ￿ = 0 ca nnot b e a soluti on t o
P3 . Second, s upp o se that 0 < ^ ￿<1 then it follo ws fro m l em m aA .1 and the a ssum ption
that ￿ y> ￿ athat
￿ ^ w
H
< ￿y: (A .1)
By raising ^ w
H
an d ^ w
N




), whic h is also








), i. e. the ag e n tn o wh a s
a stri ct prefe rence for the action a
H





)a n dt h eoriginal con tract ( ^ w;
^











t ; ^ ￿; 1) = ( 1 ￿ ^ ￿)(￿ y ￿ ￿ ^ w
H
) ￿ " :
By (A .1) and the a ssum ption ^ ￿>0 the ￿rs t term on the righ t hand side is s tri ctl y
p o siti v e . I t foll o ws that w ec an al w a ys ￿n d an " suc h tha t the who l e expre s sion is
p o siti v e .T h i si m pli es tha t the original con tract ( ^ w;
^
t ; ^ ￿ ; 1) i s not a so l ution to P3 .
Q.E. D .
Le m m aA . 4 Ther e e xists a solution (^ w;
^
t ; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ ) to P3 whic h satis￿ es ^ ￿ =1 ,i . e . in the
optimum the ag ent cho oses the ac tion a
H
wit h pr ob abilit y one.
Pro of: W e deriv eas o l ution ( ^ w;
^
t; ^ ￿; ^ ￿ )o fP 3 a n dc he c k tha t ^ ￿ =1 . W ek no w that i ti s






= 0 and that the collusi o n-pro ofness c o nstra i n t is binding. I f the
so l ution is suc h tha t the su p erv iso r h as a unique b e st r e sp ons e to m onitor then i tf o l lo ws
that ^ ￿ =1 . L e m m aA .3 then tell su st h a t ^ ￿ =1 . W e there fo re nee do n l yt oi n v estigate
m i xed eq uili bria.












￿ c= ￿, the ni t i s




=0 . B y s ubstituti on w ec a n rewri te pro bl em P3 as














































)=K ￿ c; (A .4)
where ine qua l it y (A. 2 ) is the indiv idua l ra ti o nali t y constra i n t o f the a gen t and the c on -
s t r ai n ts (A. 3 ) and (A .4) e ns ure that ￿ and ￿ ar e no t gr e at e rt h a no n e .























. There do e s not exi st a n in terna l m axim um and the
optim al w
N
i sac o rne rs o l ution. Thi si m pl ie s tha t ei ther (A .4) bi nd s, whic h dire ctl y
im pli es tha t ￿ =1 ,o rt h a t( A .3) binds, w hi c hi m pli es that ￿ = 1 from whic h it also
m us t fo l lo w that ￿ =1 . O r i t m u s tb e t h a t( A.2) bi nds . Only in the latter ca se it do es
not i m m e diatel yh o l d that ￿ =1 .
Le t the op ti m al ^ w
N















Subs t ituting ^ w
N












c K ( w
H


























) to ensure tha t ￿ ￿ 1. T he de riv ativ eo fU
P







































￿ ￿a ) then this im pl ie s that the indi vidual rationa l it y cons train ti s








+ ￿(￿y ￿ ￿a ) ￿ ￿c :








, whic hi m pli es that ￿(￿y ￿ ￿a ) >￿ c . Sinc e








)) and ￿ =￿ a=(￿w
H
), i tf o l lo ws that






































) < 0 ;











d e c r eas i ng in w
H









)) = 1. Note that thi si m pli es that if A. 4 is binding in the o pti m um then also A .2 or
A. 3i sb i nd i ng . W e concl ude tha t w em us t ha v e^ ￿ =1 .
Q.E. D.
Prop osit ion A.2 i) If ￿ ￿ (￿a ￿ Kc ) = j a
H





K c = ￿ ; 0 ) ,
^












+ K c = ￿ )
2
￿ 4 K ￿ a c = ￿ ] ,
^ ￿=1 , and ^ ￿ =￿ a=(￿ ^ w
H
) < 1 . ii) If ￿ ￿ (￿a ￿ Kc ) = j a
H
￿ Kc j an d K ￿ ￿= (1 ￿ ￿) the n
the sol ution to P3 is ^ w =( ￿ a=￿ ; a
L
=(1 ￿ ￿); 0),
^
t = (￿a = ( K ￿) ￿ a
L
=((1 ￿ ￿ )K ); 0; 0),
and ^ ￿ =^ ￿ =1 . iii) I f ￿ ￿ (￿a ￿ Kc ) = j a
H
￿ K c j and K ￿ ￿= ( 1 ￿ ￿) t hen the sol ution
to P3 is ^ w =( ￿ a =￿ ; (￿a ￿ Kc ) =￿ ; 0),
^
t = (c=￿ ; 0 ; 0),a n d ^ ￿ =^ ￿=1 .
Pro of: If the optim al c on t ra ct i nd uc es a sim ultaneous m o v eg a m ei nw h i c ha m ix ed
eq ui li brium is pl a y e d then t h e prev ious propos i tion sho w ed that for the optim um w e
m us t ha v ee i ther ^ w
H
=￿ a=￿ or cK (^ w
H






). This im pl ie s that
^ w
H










+ Kc = ￿ )
2
￿ 4 K￿ ac=￿]g. When pa ram e ters
are suc h tha t ￿ ￿ (￿a ￿ Kc ) = j a
H
￿ Kc j t he n the ￿rst e xpression i ss m al le r tha n the
second expression. T hi sc o ndit ion di st i ng ui sh e sc a se i from case ii .




￿ c= ￿ the n the pure equi li brium ￿ = ￿ =1 i s















￿ c=￿ .U si ng the fact that the collusi on -









. The t w o cons trai n ts a re t
H
￿ ￿a =(K￿ ) ￿ a
L
= ((1 ￿ ￿)K )
and t
H
￿ c=￿ . Note that the con strain ts can o nl y b e s atis￿ed if ￿ ￿ (￿a ￿ Kc ) = j a
H
￿ Kc j .
The princi pa l ’s pa y o￿ U
P
i si ncreasing i n t
H
if and only i f( 1 ￿ ￿ ) K> ￿ . In this case the34
optim um is fou nd for t
H
= c= ￿.I f ( 1 ￿ ￿ ) K< ￿ then the i nd i vi d ual rationa l it y cons tr ai n t




= ￿a=(K￿ ) ￿ a
L
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